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Abstract. British electrical manufacturing provides important insights into international business history, and demonstrates the key role of cross-border networks and agreements in its emergence. This article analyzes the factors that shaped phases in the industry’s development and international operations. The article presents, firstly, a reappraisal of electrical manufacturing’s early decades in Britain; it shows, secondly, how a changing political landscape transformed the strategies and ownership of firms, and re-evaluates the industry’s restructuring during the war and its immediate aftermath; it questions, thirdly, accounts of British electrical manufacturing failure in the 1920s, and discusses the return to strategies of cross-border networks and agreements. It, lastly, considers the lessons of British electrical manufacturing’s emergence and subsequent consolidation, weighing the influences of firm-level, national and international factors.
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British electrical manufacturing offers valuable insights into the global business system that prevailed before 1914, and reveals the importance of cross-border networks and agreements to the industry’s emergence. This article analyses, too, how domestic political and institutional change during the First World impacted on firms so highly dependent on their international connections. Contravening the notion of globalization being a contemporary phenomenon, electrical manufacturing was international from its beginnings, and the factors that shaped its evolution deserve detailed investigation. We re-appraise, firstly, electrical manufacturing’s early decades in Britain, while comparing and distinguishing between its varied business sectors. Cross-border networks determined flows of technology and know-how, and fundamentally influenced the policies and growth of firms. Widespread opinion perceived the internationally-connected British industry as controlled by German interests, and competitive failings brought unmet demands for a national policy and government intervention. The transformed political and economic landscape of the First World War, secondly, dramatically altered business ownership and strategies, and the precedence given to national priorities over international inter-firm relations constituted a new phase in the industry’s development. The restructuring of British electrical manufacturing during the war and its immediate aftermath needs re-evaluation. The article, thirdly, questions accounts of continued failure in the 1920s, while acknowledging that re-founded British firms retained weaknesses in organization and products. It investigates, additionally, why businesses that so emphasized their national disposition returned to strategies of cross-border agreements and alliances. We will, fourthly, consider the lessons to be learnt from the British industry’s emergence and subsequent consolidation, and weigh the influences of firm-level, national and international factors on its development.
Although electrical manufacturing was a key 20th century industry, few academic studies investigate its growth in Britain, although a number of sponsored company histories do exist.​[1]​ A useful account of Ferranti is available, but a survey of early industry lacks firm-level detail and does not use corporate records, while Jones and Marriott concentrate on takeover struggles and post-war mergers.​[2]​ Hughes explains the internationally transferable character of technology and electrical systems, and contrasts the worldwide peripatetic activities of engineers and managers with the very national or local legislative and regulatory framework in which enterprises operated.​[3]​ Hausman, Hertner and Wilkins stress the formative interaction of international finance, cross-border technology transfer, and the policies of national states.​[4]​ Both books deal with the evolution of electricity supply and distribution, not on electrical goods manufacture. Utilizing company archives and a wide range of industry, professional association, trade journal and government sources, this study considers the evolution and significant consequences of international business for individual electrical manufacturing firms, their management, and capabilities, and evaluates its influence alongside legislative, regulatory, and market factors.

Institutions and Markets before 1914
British manufacturers found common agreement in blaming the Electric Lighting Act of 1882 as the legislative misfortune that bestowed first mover advantages on foreign rivals. Despite initial broad support for concession terms of twenty-one years, the prospect of inadequate returns discouraged private investment in electricity generation. The ‘scrap-iron’ clause added another and in the long-term bigger disincentive by enabling local authorities to acquire after twenty-one years concerns at asset rather than business value. The 1888 amendment extending concession periods to forty-two years was quick recognition of the legislators’ mistake. The following year brought a six-fold increase in project applications, but a subsequent economic downturn dampened any renewed enthusiasm. Operationally-small generating plants and low technical standardization had knock-on effects for electricity prices and demand levels. They encouraged manufacturing diversity, and blocked scale efficiencies in heavy and power engineering and in the production of railway, tram and mining equipment. British industrialists undoubtedly exaggerated the consequences of early legislation, but the operating framework it established inhibited both the municipal and private development of a new technology. Responding to the growing demand for electrical traction, the 1898 Act constituted an important turning-point and stimulated large-scale engineering orders, although overall demand would continue to disappoint.
Byatt argues that municipally-owned and price-competitive gas supply slowed the diffusion of electrical lighting. Yet entrenched interests cannot explain the internationally low development of electrical power for tramways and machinery. Moreover, similar circumstances applied to Germany, where electrical systems and usage spread quickly. Observing lessons from the short concessions terms in the British Parliament’s 1882 Act, Berlin’s government decided instead on thirty years, a period less than the forty-two years finally adopted in Britain. It had the right of compulsory purchase as early as 1895, with the high cost of doing so receding with every year thereafter. Berlin’s ownership of gas production and supply, it was claimed, delayed the expansion of generating capacity by Berliner Elektricitäts Werke (BEW). Hughes points out how municipal government led, in partnership with BEW, the creation of a universal supply system across Berlin before 1914, and Germany’s leading Allgemeine Elektricitäts Gesellschaft (AEG) held the majority interest in BEW for much of this period. AEG was a shareholder in some 114 German utility enterprises, against 80 for Siemens & Halske, and both firms gained manufacturing economies of scale. Berlin took BEW into municipal ownership, during 1915. In New York and then Chicago, General Electric of America was given the initiative to establish city-wide systems. In Britain, the municipal and regional leadership shown in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, in north-east England, was the exception.​[5]​
British electrical manufacturers condemned many national and institutional ‘failings’. Committed to Tariff Reform, they portrayed international competition as unfair: Germany charged import duties on industrial goods, while free trade Britain did not. Callender Cable and Construction Company blamed its withdrawal from the US, Germany and Italy on tariffs, and, by 1913, Japan and Dominion governments used import duties to promote domestic industrialization. Unequal domestic competition, it was argued, held back the virtuous circle of scale manufacturing, standardization, falling prices, R&D, and growing electricity demand. Tariff reform undoubtedly determined the political fault-lines of the early 1900s, but would not have directly addressed entrenched the competitive, technological and managerial shortcomings of British electrical manufacturers. Discriminatory railway and shipping rates in foreign countries were another target. The Board of Trade’s inability to promote commerce abroad appeared legitimate criticism, and the disregard British banks showed for financing credit terms and overseas engineering projects led to large orders going to Continental businesses. Germany’s proactive government and banking system was contrasted with Britain’s laissez-faire.​[6]​ 
The founder of General Electric Company (GEC), Hugo Hirst, argued that German banks had evolved to meet the needs of manufacturers, and organized combinations to spread the risks of large investments. Japan, interestingly, was following the German model of industrial banks and business groups. Hirst contended that eleven German banks backed Siemens & Halske, while AEG was linked to eight.​[7]​ The conglomerate Elektro-Treuhand-Gesellschaft existed to coordinate the multiple funding of large projects. Once British banks had shown themselves to be risk-adverse, Dresdner Bank financed cable-laying from German West Africa to Brazil.​[8]​ Siemens & Halske was closely allied to Deutsche Bank, and AEG directors sat on the boards of major banks.​[9]​ Both enterprises founded Finanzierungsgesellsschaften with German, Swiss and Belgian banks to fund overseas power stations and utilities, on the assumption that foreign governments, municipalities or businesses would purchase German equipment and technical expertise. Deutsch Überseeische Elektricitäts Gesellschaft (DUEG), founded by Siemens & Halske and AEG, constituted the largest example of German firm FDI by 1914.​[10]​ What especially infuriated British manufacturers was City of London capital being raised by German banks to secure construction contracts for German manufacturers.​[11]​ Dick, Kerr - specialists in rail electrification – lost London’s St Pancras Station contract to better supported German rivals.​[12]​ The Bombay hydro-electric scheme, British-owned Buenos Aires tramways, and the London United Electric Railways could be cited as further failures against foreign competitors. The humiliation seemed complete when AEG constructed a British-financed hydro-electric plant at Victoria Falls in British colonial Africa. At the Electrical Trades Committee, convened by the Board of Trade during the First World War, witnesses condemned the City of London for lacking ‘national and imperial instinct’. Committee members gave vent to the period’s ingrained anti-Semitic prejudices about powerful international Jewish financiers, while, to sustain their view of Germany’s formidable industrial challenge, they praised the ‘patriotic’ Jews who ran AEG. Business combinations and supportive networks enabled German firms to plan long-term and spend on development work. British companies, with their smaller output, relied on general mercantile agents and trading companies, while the giants of AEG and Siemens & Halske used specialist overseas organizations.​[13]​
Hirst portrayed the British industrialist before 1914 as a ‘maligned, neglected quantity or as an insignificant tail to bankers, shippers, financiers and traders in the councils of State’.  The Board of Trade had no discernible policy, and Britain had ‘unorganised’ capital flows and ‘speculative dividend makers’, in contrast to German industrial banks with knowledge of and commitment to industry. Almost every other country, he contended, secured their home market through protective measures. The links between industry, government, banks, universities, railways and shipping lines in Germany indicated ‘organized competition’, and free trade orthodoxies could not meet the challenge posed by rising industrial powers.​[14]​ Two pieces of legislation hinted at a national policy. British electrical manufacturers suspected, reasonably, that foreign companies used patent registration to block industrial developments in Britain. Under the Patents and Designs Act of 1907, rights owners were given twelve months to undertake manufacturing in the UK.​[15]​ From 1912, the General Post Office assumed responsibility for the telephone system, and built five factories to curtail equipment imports, mainly from the US or Sweden. GEC, too, established a factory to supply the nationalized telephone system.​[16]​

Acquiring Capabilities before 1914
The US and Germany’s industrial transformation forced Britain to debate its seeming decline. The US gained the technological initiative in electrical engineering and products, but Germany offered the main competitive challenge to Britain. German émigré investors, entrepreneurs, managers and technicians were, furthermore, highly influential within Britain’s own electrical industry. With firms evolving through their international personal, family and professional networks, the German-born Hugo Hirst had an automatic advantage in his commercial diplomacy. Manufacturers accused German mining and commodity firms of controlling the supply and prices of minerals, notably in copper, zinc and lead. A government report would state that tungsten had been almost entirely under German control before 1914.​[17]​ Through family partnerships in the London trader, Henry R. Merton, and its worldwide interests, Metallsgesellschaft became the most important player in global metals markets.​[18]​ Despite growing international tensions between European powers, the German community was widely accepted within Britain, and prominent members were inducted or naturalized into its commercial and political establishment. International tussles over Morocco, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Tunisia, from 1905 to 1911, issued early warnings of how obscure disputes might threaten European and world peace. Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907 resolved conflicts in far-away imperial outposts, but two armed blocs gradually divided Europe. By 1914, however, suspicion of German foreign policy and military intentions had not converted into resentment against the 60,000 Germans settled in Britain. Some 5m of them could be found throughout Europe as permanent settlers or as labour migrants, and large numbers left for the US and Latin America.​[19]​
[Table 1]
The restless and ambitious Hirst grew GEC through forwards integration of his electrical supply business. He and his two most important managers, Harry and Max Railing, had been born in Germany, and, in London, Hirst initially operated through its sizeable German business community.​[20]​ Formerly called Hirsch, he became a naturalized Briton as early as 1883, later identifying himself as a patriotic industrialist, Tariff Reformer and imperialist. We have in the life of inventor and businessman, Wilhelm or Sir William Siemens, a parallel from an earlier generation. Settling in Britain during 1843, he took charge of cable makers, Siemens Brothers, an allied firm of Siemens & Halske. Naturalized in 1859, he navigated between obligations to his new country and to his German family and business partners. He was later appointed a Fellow of the Royal Society. His distant cousin and adopted son, Alexander, was a former Prussian officer with military honours. Having assumed the management of Siemens Brothers, he was twice President of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, and a founding administrator at the National Physical Laboratory.​[21]​  Like Hirst, Sir Ernest Cassel was both German and Jewish in origin, a Christian convert, and self-made. He had contacts throughout the City, supervised worldwide business deals, and his appointment as a Privy Councillor underlined the strength of his personal and political connections.​[22]​
No figures exist to illustrate the relative competitiveness of British electrical manufacturing before the First World War. Data point to factor-of-two differences in US-UK output per employee for both total manufacturing and engineering in general, due to levels of mechanization, scale, and resource advantage. Germany matched UK manufacturing productivity by 1900, and its performance continued to improve to 1914 before stalling in the decades that followed (see Table 1). Yet British productivity remained effective in several labour-intensive or skill-based industries.​[23]​ Within electrical manufacturing specifically, case studies indicate that Britain proved highly competitive in cable manufacturing and related engineering, but laggard in accumulator, battery and lamp production. In heavy electrical engineering and machinery, marked by advanced technologies and large-scale complex production, British-based producers made some headway before the First World War, but the gap with US or German rivals remained substantial. In 1913, Germany dominated imports to Britain in electrical machinery (54 per cent), lamps (76 per cent), and cables (71 per cent).​[24]​
Founded in 1886, GEC was incorporated three years later.​[25]​ The international transfer of technology and know-how defined the creation of regional and municipal electricity supply systems. The Edison and Swan United Electric Light Company was a multinational subsidiary that manufactured lamps, and it sold the Edison patents used in New York’s early electrification to London’s first commercial supply undertaking, subsequently importing the generators and equipment needed from the US.​[26]​ Cross-border networks similarly determined electrical manufacturing’s evolution. When the Edison and Swan patents in carbon lamps ended, in 1893, Hirst decided that GEC would produce its own. To realise his plan, he travelled to the US for technological and managerial assistance, but made his breakthrough while on tour in Continental Europe. He acquired a patent from C.J. Robertson, and brought him back to Britain as the experienced works manager of a new lamp enterprise. Robertson oversaw the plant installation, and, to meet quality and standardization levels, he trained workers in over 40 processes. The Robertson Lamp Works, a partnership between GEC and Robertson himself, began mass production in 1896. GEC entered a pattern of obtaining patents abroad and importing key personnel and their know-how. From the early 1890s, GEC was adapting alternate current (AC) motors from the Swiss firm of Oerlikon, and selling them to traders acting for South African mining companies. The US’s second largest electrical enterprise, Westinghouse, refused to license its AC patents, preferring to supply GEC from its own factories. Once Hirst had persuaded the Board of Trade, in 1895, to threaten a compulsory licence, Westinghouse acceded to patent sharing. In the following year, GEC decided to build the Peel Works, in Manchester, to manufacture the latest motors.​[27]​
[Table 2]
Thanks to foreign technologies and South Africa’s booming gold mines, GEC was initiated into heavy engineering; the Board of Trade, which ironically Hirst would in the future heavily criticise, had also been instrumental. GEC next expanded mining machinery sales to Australia, India, and China, and sold traction motors to the East India Railway. By 1900, the company employed sales agencies in Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Sydney, Alexandria, Tokyo, Johannesburg and Calcutta, and imperial connections secured essential supplies and mining concessions in India. The year 1903 was the first in which Britain officially recorded electrical exports, which showed a near three-fold real term increase between 1891 and 1913 (see Table 2), most prominently in favourable Empire markets. GEC purchased the Fraser and Chalmers Engineering Works because of the reputation its machinery enjoyed across the Rand goldfields. It began training personnel for posting overseas, where they were given freedom to negotiate large contracts with government departments and private businesses. By 1914, GEC had fully-owned sales subsidiaries in Australia, New Zealand, China, France, Belgium, Spain, South Africa and Rhodesia, and a 50 per cent share in two others located in Argentina and India.​[28]​
	Responding to the electric generating legislation of 1898, GEC re-capitalized in 1900 with the aim of financing a heavy engineering plant, at Witton, Birmingham. Although an ardent critic of the British banking system, Hirst acknowledged the contribution of Edward Holden, as chairman of the City and Midland Bank, in overseeing the reincorporation. A constant advisor to GEC, Holden would secure the overdraft facilities that would underwrite the company’s expansion. At Witton, GEC made military and naval searchlights, and arc lamps for railways and commercial premises. Searchlight imports proved to Hirst how ‘subsidized, organized, and protected’ foreign competition was eating into Britain’s industrial structure, leaving it strategically vulnerable. On the other hand, the project was not feasible without patents and support from Schuckert, a Berlin business that would be acquired by Siemens & Halske, in 1903, to form its heavy engineering operation, Siemens-Schuckert. The German company sent technicians to inculcate at Witton the required skills and expertise. GEC decided too to manufacture its own illuminating carbons, once again replacing their import. To do so, it brought manufacturing equipment from Germany, and put production under the daily management of foreign personnel. Hirst found the Admiralty and the War Office indifferent to his ventures, and, as the financial losses accumulated, he was by 1906 justifying his initiative as patriotic rather than commercial in motivation.​[29]​ From its 1900 reincorporation onwards, GEC was engaged in a strategy of mechanization and greater scale, while investing in its workforce and the training of imported techniques. Hirst asserted that the German working-classes, due to better schools, military service, personal discipline, and ‘cleaner hands’, were better suited to technical education, even if they were all Social Democrats and therefore Marxists.​[30]​ The chairman of Bergtheil & Young, who was himself of German-Jewish origin, contrasted foreign workers with the drunkards who, in his view, made up Britain’s labouring classes.​[31]​ Hirst accepted that the heads of German electrical companies had international experience and great commercial ability, but claimed that their scientific education could not explain the ousting of British firms from world markets.​[32]​ Callender’s chairman speculated if technically-qualified German executives could be practical commercial men.​[33]​ British industrial leaders focused their attention on government failings over tariffs, purchasing policies, and technical education rather than on their own capabilities, and their dependence on international networks dis-incentivised investment in scientific training and R&D.
[Table 3]
	GEC had opened the Robertson Works in Hammersmith, London, because it could access a plentiful supply of female labour. When, in 1898, Carl Auer von Welsbach developed his osmium filament, some 60 per cent more efficient than carbon, he initiated a trail of technological and competitive challenges.​[34]​ AEG and Siemens & Halske controlled its European patents, and their joint deal with Philips in 1903 enabled the commercial expansion of the Netherlands business.​[35]​ Hirst embarked on two years of active searching and intricate negotiation to gain a patent for a combined tungsten and osmium filament. In 1905, he was in Budapest, where he bought the Just-Hannaman rights, but, when he heard news of a squirted filament, he rushed to Berlin. GEC came to terms with Deutsche Gasglühlicht AG (DGA), which later manufactured and promoted osmium lamps in partnership with AEG and Siemens & Halske.​[36]​ GEC sent hundreds of employees to Berlin before the First World War to learn the production routines, and it imported German foremen to teach simpler tasks on site at Hammersmith. British personnel gradually replaced all foreign staff and workers, excepting the chemist who handled technical communications with Berlin. Long-term cross-border cooperation over the transfer of technology, management practices and skills made a convincing case for German and Austrian shareholding in GEC-Osram, whose output began in 1909. Contemporaries noted how light-bulb production transformed GEC into a large-scale firm.​[37]​
	German and European firms pooled their lamp patents, in 1911, but competition and rights disputes continued. General Electric of America sought to restore international cooperation through a cartel, a phenomenon of global capitalism at the time. After a series of international conferences, British Thomson-Houston (a General Electric of America subsidiary), Siemens Brothers, and GEC formed the core of the Tungsten Lamp Association (TLA) in 1912. AEG, Philips, British Westinghouse, and Dick, Kerr would join for periods.​[38]​ Clauses encouraged the pooling of future research. International cartels were secret deals, rightly treated with suspicion. The justification offered was that firms could settle disputes over patent rights, and, by avoiding price wars, invest in new technologies. Official investigations in Britain would accuse the TLA of limiting production licences, price-fixing, and profiteering. Lamp output of 25m in Britain for 1913 was significantly smaller than the US at 110m and Germany at 100m, and compared unfavourably with The Netherlands at 16m.​[39]​
	For Hirst, what was particularly interesting about negotiations over legal patents was the ‘avenues of international cooperation it throws up’. He presented a high-minded perspective: the commercial man has to be an ambassador, travelling from works to works, showing tact and perseverance, and forging highly complex sets of international and inter-firm relationships and obligations.​[40]​ Yet Britain’s shortage of trained personnel meant that ‘foreign methods could not be slavishly followed but made to fit the people available’.​[41]​ We can find before 1914 examples of British domestic cartels such as the Cable Makers’ Association (1899), whose large firms controlled some 80 per cent of production, or the Telephone Cable Makers’ Association (1904); for cross-border agreements, there existed the International Incandescent Lamp Trust (1903) and the Carbon Filament Lamp Cartel (1911), as well as the Tungsten Lamp Association, all of which largely failed in their objectives.​[42]​ But the establishment or expansion of cartels were a more notably marked trend of the interwar years. In electrical manufacturing, cartels remained only one aspect of cross-border inter-firm relations and cooperation, and their attempts to control prices and markets had limited effectiveness.​[43]​
By 1907, the gross output of British electrical manufacturing firms amounted to £12.24m (see Table 3). Three sectors were responsible for 80.4 per cent of this output: machinery and motors (34.5 per cent), power and light cables (27.4), and telegraph and telephone cables and equipment (18.5). The 1907 Census lists lamps, accumulators and batteries as major items of output for British electrical manufacturing. Radios, cooking and heating equipment, and domestic appliances are first listed in the inter-war period, when electrical auto-parts appeared under the motor vehicle section. Electrical engineering, in the 1907 and 1924 Censuses, forms a distinct sub-set of engineering, clearly differentiated from mechanical and metal engineering, which made the boilers that went to power-stations, and from electrical supply, tramway and railway utility undertakings. By 1930 and 1935, electrical manufacturing was officially listed as an entirely separate industry.​[44]​ British output expanded rapidly after 1907, and estimates put the figure in 1913 at £22.5m, in current terms, with some £7.5m going for exports. On the other hand, Britain’s record compared unfavourably with Germany’s £60m of output and £15m of exports, and much of Britain’s electrical industry was viewed as under foreign control.​[45]​
Electrical manufacturing was highly diverse in products and production techniques, but composed of four main sectors: heavy engineering, as exampled by power plant and large machinery; the ‘light’ electrical trades, such as smaller machinery and equipment; light-bulbs; and cable manufacturing and installation. British failings in the heavy sector in scale, technology and patents attracted most criticism, but success stories confounded notions of general national shortcomings. Founded in 1890, the firm of Dick, Kerr won a high international reputation for building trams and installing tramway systems, and created, in 1897, the Electrical Railway and Tramway Carriage Works Company (ERTCWC). This subsidiary was connected to the conglomerate Metropolitan Railway and Carriage Company, with whom, in 1905, it merged its electric traction interests into United Electric Carriage Company (UEEC). ERTCWC and subsequently UEEC relied on US engineers and works managers, who planned factory layout and standardization, and on foreign foremen who trained local workers in licensed technologies.​[46]​ Dick, Kerr additionally formed an alliance with the turbine and traction manufacturer, Willans and Robinson, which it fully controlled by 1916, and with large-scale engineering firms in France, Belgium and Italy.​[47]​ As we have seen, GEC made commercial breakthroughs in heavy engineering, even if it could not claim leadership. In the light trades, patents tended to be foreign-owned, and magneto manufacture occurred wholly overseas. Cable-making was the British electrical industry’s one ‘brilliant exception’, and firms could exploit the country’s position as a trading, imperial and communications hub. By building, in 1863, its works at Woolwich, London, the leading German submarine cables firm of Siemens and Halske had recognised the international advantages of operating in Britain. Originally founded as Callender's Bitumen Telegraph and Waterproof Company Limited, in 1882, the company became Callender Cable and Construction Company in 1896, expecting a boom in power generation, tramways and railway electrification orders. Callender established representative offices in India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai, and worked with Dick, Kerr on tramway contracts. Anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions were characteristic of the British cable industry in the 1900s, and its firms frequently took shares in lighting, power or tramway concerns as part payment for their services. GEC entered cable manufacture, in 1914, through a joint venture with the Italian tyre and rubber company, Pirelli, establishing a factory in Southampton, England.​[48]​ An Italian émigré, Guillermo Marconi, founded his famed wireless telegraphy company, in 1897, and went on to create two overseas subsidiaries.​[49]​ Before the First World War, the market in Britain for electric consumer durables and domestic telephones was small, and only light fittings and lamps were commonly retailed.​[50]​ Telephone usage likewise lagged: Britain had 1.7 telephones per 100 people by 1914, while the US and Sweden were ahead with respective figures of 9.7 and 4.1.​[51]​

Transferring Capabilities before 1914
Notable cases of US and German multinationals in Britain before the First World War served as a reminder that foreign firms had seized the first mover advantages in heavy engineering. Apparent market opportunities attracted investors to Britain, and the lack of a viable local partner worked against licensing or joint ventures and in favour of FDI. Instead of the acquisition of technologies, systems, personnel and skills through inter-firm networks, core capabilities were transferred intra-firm by parent multinationals to the subsidiaries they formally owned or controlled. The 1898 legislation must have been Westinghouse’s main motivation, although Hirst claimed that Board of Trade intervention over GEC’s access to its patents induced the US firm to come to Britain.​[52]​ George Westinghouse had established the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, in 1886. To avoid price-cutting and legal disputes over patents, General Electric of America and Westinghouse in 1896 exchanged licences for all lines except lighting. The firms together accounted for 75 per cent of US electrical sales, although GE was much the larger business. Westinghouse grew overseas through FDI before 1914, and founded enterprises in France, Italy, Russia and Canada.​[53]​ Erecting an industrial complex at Trafford Park, in Manchester, with its access to skilled labour and transport connections, George Westinghouse made tangible his strategic intent to lead electrical engineering in Britain and its Empire, and to transfer technological and managerial capabilities from the US. British Westinghouse Electrical and Manufacturing Co. Ltd was created, in 1899, as a mini-version of the parent business. The general managers and factory superintendents were American, and Westinghouse himself was chairman. From the outset, employees were sent to the US to be inducted in Westinghouse methods, and parent company managers and foremen regularly travelled to Britain. The Trafford Park works introduced training courses for apprentices and for staff with a ‘good general education’ or university degrees.
The predicted orders for British Westinghouse did not materialize. The aspiration to copy US production methods – as a global best practice – presumed that British customers and their consulting engineers would work to the associated technical standards and conventions. Disorganization at Trafford Park brought recurrent failure to complete orders on time, and labour turnover was high. The subsidiary, from 1905, looked to overseas demand and especially South Africa to operate at a more efficient level. In the following year, newly-appointed expatriate personnel began the process of cost-cutting, reorganizing the factory and sales department, and writing-down capital. The bankruptcy of the US parent by October 1907 nearly sank British Westinghouse, and, in May 1910, the subsidiary’s board asked George Westinghouse to step down as its chairman. Within two years, as a sign of growing independence, British Westinghouse gained the right to sell anywhere in the world, although in practice it stayed out of the US and Canada. British managers began to assume senior positions, and a new apprenticeship system acknowledged greater local responsibility for skills training. Yet the subsidiary remained dependent on Pittsburgh’s technology and technical assistance, and it had no research facilities. By 1914, it was selling in India, Australia, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Russia and Norway, and had appointed representative offices in Melbourne and Calcutta.​[54]​
Hirst argued that Trafford Park failed to achieve commercially-viable scale because German manufacturers enjoyed unreciprocated access to Britain, and British Westinghouse executives stated that their capital-intensive heavy engineering business was especially vulnerable to over-competition. Hirst drew comfort from the idea that ‘a man who speaks American is not necessarily a heaven-sent engineer’, claiming that, as early as 1904, British Westinghouse and British Thomson-Houston (BTH) were employing key indigenous staff. GEC, nonetheless, continued to rely on British Westinghouse to fulfil many of its heavy engineering orders.​[55]​ General Electric of America was formed in 1892 through the merger of Edison Electrical and Thomson-Houston, and espoused a strategy of technological investment, production scale, and product scope. It established BTH, in 1894, which initially depended on imported lines, or, with mixed success, contracting out to local manufacturers. Utilizing cooperative relations with AEG, GE left control of its subsidiary to German managers. From 1899, BTH decided to establish its own manufacturing, in Rugby, with its pool of railway engineering skills and good transport links. The works, some 97 per cent GE-owned, was operating by 1902, when the US parent established its laboratory to reaffirm its technological leadership. At BTH, British managers were exposed to the practices of General Electric’s Schenectady factory, in New York state, where they could expect up to two years’ work experience. By 1905, BTH’s electrical machinery orders were eight times those of GEC.​[56]​ GE exploited its technical superiority through international market-sharing and patent agreements, sometimes bolstered by minor equity stakes. Alliances reduced its interest in overseas subsidiaries, and GE’s approach generally differed from that of Westinghouse. In Britain, BTH competed with foreign-owned British Westinghouse and Siemens Dynamo for heavy machinery and electrical generation orders. By 1907, GE owned the patent to the Just-Hanaman tungsten light filament, in addition to the earlier Welsbach osmium version. Once its laboratories had made important improvements, the US firm turned more determinedly towards international licensing rather than FDI. By 1914, nonetheless, it owned or jointly controlled factories in Canada, France, Germany and Japan, as well as England.​[57]​
AEG was founded, in 1883, by acquiring the Edison company’s patents, and grew into Germany’s electrical conglomerate. Given market agreements with GE, AEG was not committed to manufacturing FDI, but it led worldwide investments in utilities. In 1903, when the US firm relinquished a then small shareholding in AEG, the companies made detailed agreements on patents and national markets, and Union Elektrizitäts Gesellscaft (UEG) was transferred to GE ownership. The firms founded in the following year a joint assembly operation in Italy.​[58]​ AEG’s rival, Siemens & Halske, made more significant investments in overseas manufacturing. It had created a London branch, during 1858, concentrating on submarine cables and telegraph wires. Its Woolwich works was constructed over the next five years, and the subsidiary was incorporated as Siemens Brothers in 1865. William Siemens strove to run Siemens Brothers as a separate entity to the German enterprise managed by his brother, Werner. Yet the majority of the equity remained with Berlin, also the main source of finance, and the ultimate destination for two thirds of the profits. Werner insisted on a ‘degree of linkage’ and on the British company restricting itself to home and empire markets. Siemens & Halske created directly-owned subsidiaries in St Petersburg, run by a third brother Carl, and in Vienna: these became respectively one of Russia’s most important electrical enterprises and Austria-Hungary’s biggest manufacturer. When Siemens Brothers’ shares went public in 1881, and William died two years later, the manager Ludwig Löffler became a substantial equity owner, and Siemens Brothers operated more independently of Germany. Werner and Carl together retained majority shareholding, with the British-based enterprise still needing crucial components from Berlin. By 1888, the Siemens family had bought out the disgruntled Löffler, and placed Alexander Siemens in charge. Siemens Brothers resumed as a formally-independent concern, but whose relationship with Siemens & Halske was paramount.​[59]​
In the 1890s, the ending of patent and production agreements intensified competition between AEG and Siemens & Halske, which lacked a substantial presence in power engineering and machinery. By 1897, Siemens & Halske had responded by evolving into a public company, while preserving family control. Conversion facilitated the raising of bank finance, required to diversify the product range and to move more fully into highly capital-intensive production. In parallel, by 1899, Siemens Brothers was re-founded as a public company. The firm opened the Siemens Dynamo works in Stafford, from 1901, producing the full range of electrical products from dynamos to light bulbs. Following Germany’s economic crisis of 1901-02, its electrical industry consolidated, as a result of which Siemens & Halske acquired Schuckert and founded its heavy engineering subsidiary of Siemens-Schuckert. Siemens Brothers moved some 800 employees to Stafford, retaining submarine and telegraph cable production at Woolwich, and established a sales network throughout the British Empire.  Werner Siemen’s youngest son, Carl Friedrich, oversaw the transfer to the new works. The Stafford enterprise was formally a Siemens Brothers subsidiary, but it was leased, in 1906, to Siemens-Schuckert, whose deputy manager, Karl von Köttgen, would succeed Carl Friedrich in England within a year. The British subsidiaries were by far the largest businesses controlled by Siemens & Halske.​[60]​ Despite having the ‘best type of American management’, and the support of large research laboratories at Schenectady or Pittsburgh, BTH and British Westinghouse were each an ‘absolute failure as a manufacturing operation’, while Siemens Dynamo lost money. Walter Rutherford of Dick, Kerr echoed Hirst in stating that American Scientific Management was no compensation for absent tariffs and subsidized foreign competition.​[61]​
The three major power manufacturers located in Britain, before 1914, were foreign-owned, as were many other firms.​[62]​ German interests controlled the Anglo-Argentine Company cable business. The Enfield Electric Cable Company was a joint venture between German firms and Standard Telephone Company, owned at the time by Western Electric, and it was run by non-naturalized German managers. AEG held 98 per cent of Tudor Accumulator Company’s shares. The Union Company was controlled by UEG, an AEG and then a GE subsidiary, and it was located in the London and south-eastern cable industry cluster around Silvertown, Woolwich, Erith and Dagenham, where Siemens Brothers and Callender could be found. The émigré entrepreneur Hermann Oppenheimer founded the Phoenix Telegraph and Electric Works Ltd.​[63]​ Like the personal biographies of German-born entrepreneurs and financiers that settled in Britain, the history of multinational subsidiaries engaged in electrical manufacturing before the First World War appears to disprove a tenet of established international business theory: they did not confront or need to develop strategies to cope with the problem of being foreign. There were no policy barriers or significant institutional biases against their operations; as indigenous enterprises complained, quite the contrary. Electrical manufacturers acted effectively at an international level, as exporters, and, critically, through cross-border technology and knowledge transfer, strategic alliances, and personal networks.

War and International Business 1914-21
The First World War altered government-business relationships, as well as disrupting global markets. In pursuit of ‘total’ industrialized war, combatant nations reorganized their national economies, and mobilized entire populations and troops in unprecedented numbers. The conversion of factories into munitions makers; state controls on industrial production, transport and manpower; and, finally, consumer rationing had deep economic, political and social repercussions. Trade dependence brought submarine warfare and shortages, and the old faith in the free trade of goods, people and capital clashed with the overriding requirement of national security. For the British electrical industry, events had validated its campaign against the ‘unfair’ imports that they claimed had stunted industrial progress and left the country strategically exposed. The state acquired a role in building industrial capabilities, at first to ensure victory, and subsequently to secure vital industries and long-term prosperity. The war became an opportunity to revive British science and British electrical manufacturing. Firms introduced new product lines and expanded production, with major conglomerates aspiring to be world competitive also emerging. For Hugo Hirst, the national emergency had forced government to talk to industrialists and to acknowledge ‘the importance of production in the modern economic system’.​[64]​ 
By 1914, Britain had become wholly reliant on imported magnetos, some 90 per cent of them manufactured by Robert Bosch, to fire the ignitions of automobiles and aircraft. At the British government’s urging, six firms began magneto production, and the US-owned BTH led breakthroughs in research and mass production.​[65]​ These manufacturers gave evidence, in 1916, to the Electrical Trades Committee, appointed to advise the Board of Trade on future policy. While re-iterating long-standing issues over tariffs and finance, they argued for imperial-wide patent harmonization and product standardization, improved technical education, and better commercial intelligence and trade representation abroad. They accepted that British industry had under-invested in scientific research. Britain’s magneto manufacturers argued that national security could again be threatened after the war, and that the capital they had patriotically committed would be at risk. Their solution was legal entitlement to Bosch’s patents, and a 33.3 per cent import tariff, which was forthcoming under the Safeguarding of Industries Act 1921.​[66]​ The lighting and auto-parts manufacturer, Lucas, grew into a large business, thanks to war-time opportunities to manufacture magnetos and other products. In the inter-war years, it would prosper through contractual and technical associations with British and US automobile firms.​[67]​ For the Institute of Electrical Engineers, the war presented a chance to prohibit unfair German competition, and supported the case for large industrial groups engaged in heavy electrical engineering.​[68]​ While condemning the curses of ‘ca’canny’ and ‘one man, one vote’,  the chair of the Cable Makers Association sought a Ministry of Industries, improved consular support overseas, preferential railway and shipping rates for exporters, and extended product standardization.​[69]​ The British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers Association (BEAMA) broadly agreed, advocating in addition technical education on the German model and greater industry-finance cooperation.​[70]​
Despite diplomatic tensions before the First World War, Germans had worked and established businesses in Britain without difficulties. Stories of atrocities against the Belgian population did not incite attacks on German property, but the Lusitania’s sinking in May 1915 created widespread animosity. Rioters attacked German shopkeepers and tradesmen, and the army was called out to restore order. Properties owned by members of the Jewish community with German or foreign-sounding names were attacked. Approximately 2,000 premises were damaged in London alone, where a temporary bread shortage ensued. Some 32,000 Germans and Austrians would be interned, and 10,000 of these would be repatriated during the war. From November 1914, the Public Trustee was empowered to seize enemy property, share dividends, bank balances, patents and trademarks. The Trading with the Enemy Act, effective from the beginning of 1916, prohibited and permanently sequestrated any company controlled by or carried out principally for the benefit of enemy aliens. Property seized, by 1917’s end, equalled over £107m. Suspicion fell on banks with German origins, such as Kleinwort and Schroder. Since almost every large bank had business dealings with German nationals, the industry was subject to licensing rather than sequestration. The government became determined to exclude all German involvement in the metal trades, and achieved this objective through a licensing system under the Non-Ferrous Industry Act 1918. Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Disconto Gesellschaft, and A.R. Merton were amongst the banks and traders subject to official regulation, and Siemens Brothers, Siemens Dynamo, Union Cable, BASF, and Bosch would be prominent confiscations. By 1919, just over 22,000 Germans were left in Britain.​[71]​

Sequestration and Mergers 1914-21
Alongside the rapid growth in demand and output, the major wartime change for the electrical industry was the conversion of two heavy and power engineering multinational subsidiaries into British-owned businesses. The sequestration of Siemens Dynamo and the purchase of British Westinghouse posed attendant questions about building large-scale enterprises with independent capabilities in production, sales, and product development. In practice, successor firms would encounter difficulties in shedding long-term international associations, and cross-border agreements and alliances reasserted themselves. The seizure of Siemens Dynamo meant that the British government had to make a major decision affecting the future of a vital industry. The Electrical Trades Committee (ETC) acknowledged the high importance of this former German subsidiary, because, compared to British Westinghouse and BTH, it was ‘far the best of the three in every way’. At the outbreak of war, its managing director, Köttgen, was interned, and the experience and know-how of his deputy were deemed essential to the war. Originally a Prussian civil servant and international telegraph engineer, Georg von Chauvin was reinvented as the naturalized British citizen George Chauvin in November 1914, and his son would see active service with the British army on the Western front. Chauvin was placed in charge of both Siemens Brothers and Siemens Dynamo, although they would operate under public supervision. By 1916, Siemens had developed into ‘a one-man management’, and Chauvin would claim that he had for years been seeking to make Siemens Dynamo into a locally-owned concern. He thought acquisition by a large munitions firm – a hint against the circling Vickers, the shipbuilding, engineering and armaments conglomerate – would bring failure, and he preferred owners that could more directly understand the electrical business and inject substantial capital.​[72]​ The ETC supported Chauvin’s call for an electrical combination that could access Siemens Dynamo’s know-how.​[73]​ The Board of Trade blocked Vickers, just as it stopped the firms that ran the CMA acquiring the sequestrated Union Cable Company: it wanted instead to create new and dynamic firms.​[74]​
The war had indicated the need for amalgamations, larger plants, and stronger internal organizations, particularly in heavy engineering, if British firms were to match the resources, highly trained staff, and elaborate research organizations of German companies.​[75]​ Yet the Siemens Brothers cable business was sold, in 1917, to financiers, C.B. Crisp & Company. Concerns were expressed in Parliament about German-born managers remaining in charge of major businesses, and Chauvin’s retention at Siemens Brothers was interpreted as a ruse for bringing back German control.​[76]​ Entrenched suspicion of the visible and hidden hold of Germany on the British economy continued after the First World War.​[77]​ The Board of Trade ultimately sold Siemens Dynamo to the English Electric Manufacturing Company. The business had been founded, in December 1918, through the merger of Phoenix Dynamo Manufacturing and the Coventry Ordnance Works, plus Dick, Kerr and associated enterprises such as Willans and Robinson. Engineering, shipbuilding, armaments and tram makers forged strategic connections with the new business. Dick, Kerr brought its connections with the John Brown, Cammel Laird, Thomas Firth & Sons, Harland and Wolff, and Fairfield shipbuilding and engineering conglomerates, some of whom appointed directors to English Electric’s board, swapped shares, or founded joint ventures.​[78]​ Developing the international links Dick, Kerr had created by licensing its technology and designs, English Electric formed two overseas joint ventures in tramway installation: Société Constructions Electriques de France, in partnership with Banque de l’Union Parissiene (BUP), and Société Constructions Electriques de Belgique, in alliance with Société Générale de Belgique, the financial holding company that controlled much of its country’s economy. In July 1919, English Electric and a group of French companies bought shares in Société Générale Belge d'Entreprises Electriques.​[79]​ In December, English Electric formally took control of Siemens Dynamo for its resources, know-how and technology and because the ‘elimination of competition would be of considerable value’. Both the Siemens and Willans & Robinson dynamos were viewed as leaders in electrical generation, and these subsidiaries exchanged personnel, technical information, products and designs. English Electric established a single headquarters management for its six works, although ownership of Dick, Kerr was not officially transferred until April 1921.​[80]​
For Hugo Hirst, conflict with Germany had exposed the folly of sacrificing home industries in pursuit of the lowest prices, and proven the case for a ‘national industrial policy’. The Army and Royal Navy now relied on GEC searchlights, and Hirst portrayed the building of the Witton factory as a far-sighted patriotic act. When anti-German feeling reached its height, he condemned as a Bavarian the ‘Prussianization’ of the German Empire, and proudly proclaimed how he had chosen to become British. Hirst claimed, retrospectively, that he had disregarded his firm’s interests by going ahead with the GEC-Osram works, and that only legal, technological and managerial necessity had forced him to involve German and American interests.​[81]​ Nonetheless, he argued, a mere six per cent foreign shareholding had ensured the transfer of essential know-how and halted any import threat. The City and Midland Bank helped GEC to acquire these shares from the Public Trustee, but not before GEC had been boycotted in New South Wales for its German alliances. The India Office, moreover, instructed GEC to cease holding shares on behalf of enemy aliens in Travancore Minerals.​[82]​
World conflict, said Hirst, had made the British electrical industry realize that ‘we have sat still too long and looked admiringly at the progress of our foreign rivals’, and that, with government support, it should merge into two to four big concerns respected worldwide. ​[83]​ Encouraged by high war-time profits, GEC embraced a strategy of manufacturing in every sector of the electrical industry at scale. From 1916, Hirst worked with Dudley Docker, the opportunistic dealmaker, and chairman of the Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon and Finance Company (MCWFC). Docker’s US contacts enabled GEC to buy sequestrated German patent rights to automatic bulb-blowing machines. Next, Docker tried but failed to buy Siemens Dynamo for GEC. Hirst, from 1917, placed his hopes on a merger with MCWFC, again with the help of Docker, ‘ever in the vanguard where British Industrial Progress is concerned’, he asserted. Once more with Docker working behind the scenes, GEC looked to buy British Westinghouse, but decided against proceeding. Without Siemens Dynamo or British Westinghouse to transform GEC, the company switched to a mixed strategy of smaller acquisitions, building new facilities, securing patents, and financing research. Self-sufficiency, paradoxically, could not end the need to acquire patents from foreign or former enemy concerns. During 1918, GEC bought Fraser and Chalmers, ‘to be in the forefront for heavy Plant’.​[84]​ The City and Midland Bank supervised recapitalization during 1919, a move designed to finance post-war expansion in world markets.​[85]​ GEC-Osram had been wholly dependent on DGA’s technical resources, and, from 1916 onwards, it was planning its own research facilities. GEC borrowed staff from the National Physical Laboratory, a concrete example of government support, and many of them stayed as permanent employees. To fulfil an ambition to be a world-leading electrical manufacturer, and explicitly to avoid relying on German science, the GEC Research Laboratory was formed to serve the whole business, formally opening in 1923.​[86]​
Dudley Docker repeated his failure to buy Siemens Dynamo, this time for Vickers, but he did gain British Westinghouse as consolation. An admirer of German cartels, Docker wanted to build a giant electrical enterprise within the Vickers engineering and munitions conglomerate. He had the active support of the chairman, Douglas Vickers, and the Midland Bank, which, it is said, could refuse him nothing. In the charged atmosphere of the First World War, British Westinghouse’s board concluded that foreign ownership prejudiced its future, and, in 1917, Westinghouse in the US sold its remaining stake. Docker’s MCWFC and Vickers had joint control of British Westinghouse by May, and their dual lamp interests were placed in a recently-constituted Cosmos subsidiary. Vickers bought out MCWFC in March 1919, and, in September, British Westinghouse was renamed the Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company (or Metro-Vick). Westinghouse and Metro-Vick remained in contact, and agreed on a division of international markets. During 1918 and 1919, Docker schemed to merge Metro-Vick with BTH, in order to fashion an ‘electrical engineering corporation like those in US and Germany’, but terms eluded him. In the meantime, Metro-Vick sold the German, French and Italian Westinghouse companies to Swiss engineers Brown, Boveri et Cie.​[87]​ Vickers concentrated its own electrical output at Trafford Park, and Metro-Vick accessed Vickers’ worldwide selling organization. Separated from Westinghouse, Metro-Vick set up a Research Department, with a laboratory, in 1919. Sir Ernest Hiley, representing Vickers on the Metro-Vick board, stated that it was no longer in the national interest to rely on the US for product designs and research. The aim was ‘to build up this business until it can take its place among the foremost industries of the world, for electrical enterprises has [sic] been too long in the hands of other nations’. The absence of scientific study had been ‘a great blot on the whole organisation of the Company’. Metro-Vick created, furthermore, an Education Department to recruit and train the personnel it needed to be internationally competitive.​[88]​

National Firms and International Links 1921-1929
What were the consequences of wartime restructuring and organization-building? Britain’s electrical manufacturers expected economic uncertainty after the war, but the depth of the 1919-21 slump was never anticipated. However, from 1924 to 1929, they achieved notable increases in trade and output, although the disruption to Germany’s economy and the loss of its overseas markets undoubtedly increased opportunities. Britain, in 1913, had been behind Germany in exports of electrical machinery and apparatus, telegraph and telephone equipment, and batteries and accumulators, and it exercised leadership only in cables and wires; Britain was, by 1924, selling more overseas than Germany in all four sectors. Amongst the six largest exporters of electrical goods, by 1925, Britain held a 32 per cent share in the heavy and machinery sector, and 54 per cent in wire and cables. The third largest exporter of all electrical goods in 1913, Britain was ahead of the US and Germany in 1925 with a 35 per cent share (Table 4). Total British electrical exports followed an upward real terms trend in the 1920s, and showed a capacity to recover after the Great Depression (Table 2). Electrical imports relative to the domestic market fell in the 1920s, notably so in the case of machinery and insulated wire and cable (Table 5). The US replaced Germany as the largest importer, accounting for some 60 per cent. The import figures for radios, vacuum cleaners and batteries, comparatively high at 12-17 per cent, reflected growing US advantage in household appliances and consumer goods. Accumulators and magnetos remained protected by the Safeguarding of Industries Act.​[89]​
[Tables 4 & 5]
	British electrical manufacturing output was markedly higher by the mid-1920s compared to the pre-1914 period, and machinery and cables dominated in value terms. British firms had made headway in the technologically and organizationally-complex machinery sector, and retained primacy in cable-making. In the later 1920s, the building of the national grid and the rising use of electricity boosted machinery and lamp production. Radio manufacturing was an inter-war phenomenon, particularly the 1930s, when televisions made their commercial appearance (Table 3). Consumer expenditure on lamps and lighting accessories expanded quickly, as did sales of domestic electrical appliances, which had been previously negligible.​[90]​ The US productivity lead in total manufacturing and in engineering lengthened. During the inter-war period, total German and British manufacturing overall demonstrated similar performance-levels, with German engineering gaining some ground by the end of the 1930s. British manufacturing productivity generally improved, and the British record was defendable against most industrial nations until the post-war decades. We have no comparative data for electrical manufacture as a whole, but US-UK output per employee ratios for lamps and radios were 543 and 347 respectively for 1935-37 (Table 1). Figures for the period after 1945 suggest long-term productivity problems in electronic tubes and household appliances. Lamp production had evolved into a large-scale automated process, in which US firms had demonstrable advantages, whereas electrical machinery and accumulators involved substantial skills and labour input. While, therefore, British producers began to compete more effectively in the heavy sector, mass production and standardization in the light electrical branches such as telephones, batteries, meters, insulated wire, and domestic appliances shifted advantages to low prices and to US firms.​[91]​ Since lamp firms were shielded by the industry’s most far-reaching cartel arrangements, British lamp prices during the 1920s were high, although uncontrolled cheap non-branded imports appeared in the 1930s.​[92]​ Net output and employment in British electrical manufacturing grew throughout the inter-war years, and net output per employee indicated improving performance in the 1920s before falling slightly during the Great Depression (Table 5).
[Table 6]
	US industrial interests replaced Germany as the major formative influence on British, European and Japanese electrical manufacturers, due to exports and acquisitions, but also through recast inter-firm links. Lamp making offers a notorious example. The Electric Lamp Manufacturers’ Association was formed, in 1919, as a mechanism for avoiding patent litigation. Crucially, it facilitated inter-firm licensing and the pooling of research and advanced factory methods, and it sought to address over-capacity by curtailing output and price-cutting. The ELMA initially covered some 90 per cent of world production, but was quickly undermined by low-price competitors.​[93]​ AEG, Siemens and Auergesellschaft founded the Osram company, during 1919, buying up smaller German firms, and established the world’s largest lamp manufacturer. In the same year, Gerald Swope led the founding of International General Electric, which would oversee plants in Europe, Latin America and Asia, and bring GE Canada back under multinational control. Western Electric in the 1920s developed a parallel mix of overseas factories, joint ventures, and minority holdings. Through IGE, Swope expanded the international inter-firm exchange of technical assistance, expertise, training, patents, and royalties, and negotiated market divisions. A renewed cooperative agreement with GE in 1919 formed the cornerstone of Philips’ post-war policy - despite its links to German businesses - and Swope sat on the Netherlands firm’s board. Philips imitated the US giant by buying equity in factories in Spain, England, Austria and Switzerland, and it emerged as the world’s number two lamp manufacturer. In 1921, IGE acquired a minority stake in AEG, re-establishing the equity connection relinquished some eighteen years before, and the two firms extended their patent, invention and market-sharing collaboration. When Osram and Philips’ 1921 agreement to manage lamp overcapacity failed, it allowed Swope to embark on another round of commercial diplomacy. GE and Osram signed a deal in 1922, forestalling the German firm’s entry to the US, and lamp deals with AEG and Compagnie des Lampes followed. With GE’s technological advantages, and networks of cross-border equity shares and inter-firm agreements, Swope was instrumental in forming a company to oversee a world-wide lamp cartel. The Swiss-based Phoebus S.A. Compagnie Industrielle pour la Developement de l’Eclairage, initially involving 27 firms, was founded in 1924. It bought up production capacity or compensated for reduced output, and exercised responsibility for quality standards, testing, marketing, and patent and knowledge transfer. Competition from an alliance of Scandanavian firms, during the 1930s, would undermine Phoebus’s efforts to limit international rivalry.​[94]​ Anti-trust legislation made US firms wary of inter-firm collusion, and, even in Europe, cartel arrangements eventually disappointed participants. A technologically-complicated industry encouraged collusive behaviour in patent exchanges and standardization. But competition over service and product quality continued, and price arrangements invariably proved difficult to sustain.​[95]​
Did the British electrical industry end its reliance on overseas technologies and inter-firm agreements, and become possessed of its own capabilities in management, technology and skills? A government report recorded how Britain’s engineering firms had advanced in management and organization during the war, claiming they had created some of the ‘best works’, with modern equipment operated at the highest efficiency. On the other hand, no British engineering business had gained the scale and standardization of the US or Germany, and scientific departments were usually glaringly absent.​[96]​ The 1924 Census of Production reported that production methods in British electrical engineering had noticeably advanced. The Electrical Review recalled the German grip on the industry before the First World War, but portrayed it, in 1925, as much better placed.​[97]​ For BEAMA, the insecure home market, lower standardization, inadequate financial support, and the Board of Trade’s failings were unresolved constraints, yet specifically blamed individual firms for their deficiencies in mass production, scientific management, and technological research. The founding of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), from 1922, gave a fillip to radio production, cables, wires, and electricity consumption. While the 1919 Electricity Supply Act failed through its reliance on voluntary mergers by generators, legislation in 1926 created a Central Electricity Board that constructed a national grid and stimulated demand for heavy generation plant and distribution equipment. Within a decade, electricity consumption in Britain equalled other nations with similar incomes. Some 12 per cent of households had been wired for electricity by 1920, but a jump to 32 was achieved by 1931, followed by another to 65 by 1938.​[98]​
The 1920s witnessed trends in concentration and improvements in business organization and production methods. The four giant concerns and generator equipment manufacturers of English Electric, Metro-Vick, BTH and GEC held, by 1930, 30 per cent of the capital invested in British electrical manufacturing, and the top 20 firms accounted for 50 per cent.​[99]​ GEC in the 1920s formally adopted a policy of recruiting graduates and investing in management organization.​[100]​ Metro-Vick especially and BTH also developed well-regarded industrial training and apprenticeship schemes, plus programmes of graduate recruitment and training for management, engineering and technical staff.​[101]​ But BTH, as a multinational subsidiary, relied entirely on GE’s research and product development, in contrast to British-owned Metro-Vick and GEC which established their own facilities.​[102]​  Despite its R&D initiatives, GEC remained reliant on foreign patents, and commonly shared research results with rivals to meet its cartel obligations and avoid legal disputes.​[103]​ The company’s declared ‘national’ policy of not relying on German science contrasted with the reality of its cooperation with AEG and Siemens & Halske, alongside its arrangements with GE and the Standard Telephone Company, acquired by International Telegraph and Telephone (ITT).​[104]​ Lucas grew in the 1920s as the main automotive and lighting supplier to Morris Motors. It did not invest significantly in R&D or in managerial personnel, but secured technology and product lines through market-sharing agreements with Bosch and through transatlantic commercial diplomacy.​[105]​ In heavy engineering, Siemens-Schuckert established a close working relationship with GE, as AEG did with Brown Boveri. Siemens-Schuckert had, from 1924, a patent and know-how agreement with Westinghouse, and sought to apply US production methods at its factories in Germany.​[106]​ BTH failed to invest in its works or in managerial reorganization until joining Metro-Vick within the holding company of Associated Electrical Industries (AEI), formed in 1928 as ostensibly British-owned while in reality IGE controlled. AEI oversight failed, however, to reconcile the instinctive rivalry between Metro-Vick and BTH until the Great Depression, when it cut costs in administration and duplication.​[107]​ During the 1920s, English Electric’s modest profits turned into annual losses, and the company failed to rationalize its various works. When, in 1930, English Electric appointed George Nelson from Metro-Vick as managing director, he heavily criticised the administrative methods and out-of-date machinery.​[108]​ Siemens Dynamo had relied before the First World War on technological inputs from Siemens-Schuckert or Siemens & Halske. Neither Siemens Dynamo nor Dick, Kerr, as predecessor firms, had the capacity to initiate an R&D function at English Electric. 
From fear of arousing political and local criticism, cross-border arrangements were clandestine. Unstable global demand and production over-capacity inclined firms in the 1920s towards inter-firm cooperation, including cross-ownership, and towards market-sharing and output restrictions. The GEC board willingly, but confidentially, contemplated investment and managerial direction by GE, in 1922 and again in 1928. Although agreement was not forthcoming, Hirst believed that ‘ultimately a way will be found to reconcile the needs of national industry with the requirements of any international obligations’, in effect acknowledging a significant conflict. The commercially pragmatic attitude of GEC’s board provides context to Docker’s apparent transformation in quick time from industrial patriot into a hawker of national assets. Public rhetoric contrasted with the realities of cosmopolitan pragmatism and foot-loose deal-making. It was GE’s attempt, from 1929 onwards, to take over GEC by stealth that soured relationships between the companies.​[109]​ GE avoided a majority holding in AEG, for fear of provoking national resentments, and kept its stakes in the firm and in Siemens from public knowledge.​[110]​ Vickers never overcame its purchase of British Westinghouse at the too high price negotiated by Docker. Although Metro-Vick formally separated from Westinghouse, it retained cooperation over technology and markets.​[111]​ During 1927, Sir Reginald McKenna of Midland Bank approached his long-term associate, Hugo Hirst, about merging GEC, MV and BTH. After lengthy consideration, Hirst felt that the timing was not right for GEC, and, instead, GE took control of Metro-Vick, less than ten years after being ‘freed’ of US ownership. By 1929, the US multinational had placed Metro-Vick, BTH, Ediswan and Ferguson-Paulin within a seemingly-British AEI.​[112]​ Opinion within British electrical manufacturing shifted from war-time opposition to foreign ownership to support for transnational dealings and cross-shareholding and the restructuring of global over-capacity.​[113]​ Outward FDI allowed further examples of cooperation. English Electric owned an engineering and traction motor firm in Japan, from 1923, in alliance with GE and Westinghouse. Metro-Vick formed, during 1926, a joint-venture with Westinghouse International and local business interests in Spain, and relied on the US firm supplying the expatriate staff that provided ‘technical control and management of the Works’.​[114]​
Conclusion: the Dimensions of International Business
Cross-border personal and inter-firm networks and particularly links with Germany shaped British electrical manufacturing’s development from the 1890s. Commercial diplomacy and international agreements determined the stages by which GEC grew into a large enterprise, including its entry into mining machinery, motors, and lamps. While Hirst identified himself and his company as British, he and his key managers had a German upbringing and transformative Europe-wide connections. Émigré Germans provided the leadership of BTH in the 1890s and GEC into the post-war period, and they managed Enfield Cable, Phoenix Telegraph, Siemens Brothers, Union Cable, Siemens Dynamo and others before 1914. Networks constituted more than signing rights and technology agreements, and needed the transfer of personnel, skills, and product and production know-how. Acquiring firms had to build organizations with the ‘absorptive capacity’ to learn and instil knowledge, systems and routines.​[115]​ GEC created the management and marketing capabilities to manufacture a wide range of electrical goods on an increasing scale. A growing export market obviated the difficulties of comparatively slow domestic demand, but, utilizing its global networks, the company showed no interest in R&D. Dick, Kerr expanded by adopting and learning US methods in tram manufacture, and likewise did not invest in product development.
Evidence points to a highly internationalized British industry characterized by determinant inter-company networks and the transfer of technologies, products, and managerial capabilities. Figures for the ratio of FDI stock to global GDP in 1914 (at 11.1 per cent) would not be exceeded until 1993 (at 11.3 per cent), and illustrate noteworthy levels of international economic integration.​[116]​ Technology, know-how and skills acquisition through cross-border networks amongst electrical manufacturers indicated another significant aspect of international economic integration. The defining global dimensions of firms overlapped with influential national factors. Britain’s regulatory and institutional framework contributed to electricity generation and distribution’s tardy advance, and uneven and low per capita power consumption restricted the domestic market and manufacturing scale. Manufacturers blamed their unimpressive performance on electricity’s slow diffusion and on free trade. The tariff question had small relevance for cable-making and installation, a recognised national success. Import duties would have raised the costs of magnetos, lamps or generators, and did not guarantee domestic firms taking up their production. GEC and others, on the other hand, showed that growth and product diversification against foreign competition was feasible, given an ability to adapt acquired technologies and systems. Case examples indicate an association between managerial initiative and organizational outcomes, and underline the relevance of firm-level factors in forming international networks and implementing capability transfer. Yet these strategies posed questions about the nation’s intrinsic industrial strength. Electrical manufacturers, critical of British banks, could in fact obtain the finance to expand plant and diversify products, but they were disadvantaged in funding large-scale deals and engineering contracts at home and overseas.
Multinational investment determined the heavy sector’s evolution. Westinghouse was committed to international expansion through fully-controlled subsidiaries, while GE inclined towards licensing and strategic alliances. Siemens & Halske used family partnerships and networks to coordinate its businesses overseas, although political pressure might necessitate the involvement of local interests. None perceived a viable partner in Britain, and directly-managed subsidiaries had the advantage of easing resource, technology and advanced know-how transfer. US and German multinationals saw the 1898 legislation as stimulating demand for traction motors and power engineering, but would be disappointed. Revealingly, large-scale foreign companies in Britain encountered operational and managerial difficulties despite compensating firm-specific advantages. Before 1914, Siemens Dynamo, BTH and especially British Westinghouse had to adapt their methods to local market conditions: the confidence of parent multinationals in their products and management ran up against the inadequate or laggard absorptive capacity of their subsidiaries. The transfer of capabilities in the technologically and organizationally complex heavy engineering sector presented the biggest challenges. 
In explaining the development of electrical enterprise in Britain to 1914, we can draw on international business literature. One influential body of work explains FDI through the parent multinational having an ‘ownership’ or firm-specific advantage in technology or management systems. The existence of localization factors, such as transport costs, tariffs, or market responsiveness, would further justify overseas production in a host economy over exporting. The parent multinational’s strategy and the resources and capabilities it transfers internationally and internally shape the subsidiary’s management.​[117]​ Mainstream international business theory says less about the practicalities and limitations of resource and capability transfer, or, after the initial act of FDI, about a subsidiary’s long-term evolution. British Westinghouse’s early history was especially characterized by needed adaptations of transferred production methods and management, and Siemens Dynamo and BTH encountered similar challenges. The hybridization of internationally transferred practices, due to host country markets and contexts, occurred in both foreign-owned and internationally-networked local businesses, emphasizing, interestingly, shared concerns.​[118]​ Enterprises face the dilemma of seeking internal or bilateral consistency in their cross-border organization or networks (facilitating international capability transfer) and external consistency with the host economy (hindering international capability transfer).​[119]​ A focus on subsidiary management and objectives is especially relevant if British Westinghouse’s long-term evolution and its changing relationship with its US parent is to be understood.​[120]​
Internationally-acquired capabilities were as transformative in Britain as those transferred to multinational subsidiaries. Firms may seek to exploit technological or managerial ownership advantages commercially, yet perceive no localization incentives in operating overseas. As opposed to directly-controlled subsidiaries, they can consider the alternative international strategy of licensing a technology, product or process.​[121]​ Parallel to the FDI literature, interest is usually concentrated on the licensing multinational’s strategic intent and on capability transfer from a home to host economy. The role of firms buying technologies, products and techniques through agreements and networks in effecting that transfer has received less attention. As most obviously indicated by GEC, the motives of acquirers, the ability to absorb new technologies and systems, and long-term organizational development deserve full consideration. Knowledge becomes embedded in the experience, organizational routines, practices and documents of firms, while commercially applied and adapted to market and institutional contexts.​[122]​ Personal connections, experience, and repeated exchanges greatly determined the stability and efficacy of inter-firm international business networks.​[123]​ Hirst was self-admittedly no technologist, but an organization builder with extensive political, industry and international connections.
Hughes argues that electrical supply evolved in a series of phases. After the period of the inventor-entrepreneur, epitomised by Thomas Edison, it was the combined activities of inventors, entrepreneurs and financiers that enabled technology transfer from one region or nation to another. Enterprises subsequently chose between systems, and resolved technological and organizational problems. The fourth phase, the most important, occurred during the inter-war period: critical mass was achieved through a major increase in capital in accepted systems and greater involvement from governments, regulatory bodies, educational systems, and professional societies. Hausman, Hertner and Wilkins contrast the pre-1914 global economy, cross-border capital flows, and the building and management of utilities by private multinational engineering enterprises with inter-war decades marked by a trend towards government intervention and publicly-owned or locally-controlled concerns.​[124]​ Electrical manufacturing’s highly diverse nature is much more difficult to characterise. Technological, organizational, operational or regulatory breakthroughs in cable-making and international telegraph services occurred at a particularly early point by the mid-19th century.​[125]​ Global patent and production agreements and cartels had the biggest influence on the strategies of lamp enterprises. More generally, entrepreneurs and firms in electrical manufacturing had, by the 1890s, taken over from inventor-entrepreneurs; they were organizing, in addition, the international transfer of technologies through licensing, networks and FDI, and overcoming difficulties in their manufacture and marketing. The First World War was a turning-point by disrupting international economic relations and necessitating state intervention in national economies. Trade and technology dependence raised questions about immediate and post-war national security. Sequestrated German assets forced the British government to consider industrial restructuring, and wartime circumstances induced Westinghouse to sell its subsidiary to local interests. Business leaders saw an opportunity for striking lucrative deals, and advocated, at least publicly, the value of a nationally-owned and operationally-independent electrical industry. British firms obtained greater scale, improved management, and increased standardization, most notably in heavy and power engineering.
One notable theoretical perspective emphasizes the pressures exerted by nationally-distinct sets of embedded ‘institutions’ in government, educational systems, labour markets, or technology networks on firms. Such ‘institutionalism’ copes uneasily with cross-border commerce and investment having a long-term influence on practices and capabilities. The theory suggests additionally that determining institutions become fixed in their composition at any early point in a nation’s industrialization.​[126]​ Analysis on how precisely national institutions shape the management of either indigenous firms or multinational subsidiaries is limited. But electrical manufacturing was highly global in strategies and organization during its formative decades, and Britain presented no significant institutional barriers to the success of émigré entrepreneurs, international commerce, or foreign-owned enterprises. The military, governmental and economic crisis caused by the First World War brought both the restructuring of an industry and altered the market and institutional context. An historical perspective underlines how the development of businesses and domestic politics were not immutable or on some fixed path, and the First World War created a complex, rapidly-evolving but unresolved situation for British electrical manufacturing. The conflict brought the domestic production of magnetos and scientific appliances, using confiscated patents, and founded large-scale British-owned firms in heavy and power manufacturing. Arguments over British technological ‘declinism’ continue, but these companies did invest in R&D and scientific personnel.​[127]​ It was BTH as a dependent multinational subsidiary that never founded its own product development capabilities. Metro-Vick and GEC, in addition, upgraded their internal organization and managerial personnel, and Metro-Vick and BTH established noted and ambitious apprenticeship schemes. Inter-war US-owned firms presented themselves as being ostensibly British, and locally-owned enterprises with their own extensive international links were complicit in protecting this public image.
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Table 2: British Exports of Electrical Goods, 1891-1938
		Current Values	Merchandise	Real Values
















Table 3: Gross Output (£m) of British Electrical Manufacturing
Industry, 1907-35, in Current and Constant Terms
	1907	1924	1930	1935










Total in constant (1924) prices	20.92		59.79		83.73		84.24
Sources: Census of Production (London: HMSO: 1907, 1924, 1930, 1935).












Source: BT55/49, Board of Trade, Committee on Industry and Trade, 1927, C.82018, p.853; League of Nations, International Economic Conference, Geneva, May 1927.

Table 5: Electrical Manufactured Imports as a
Percentage of Consumption in Britain, 1913-35
					1913			1924	1930	1935
	Machinery			14.7 			6.6	5.1	1.4
	Insulated wire & cable		9.5			2.8	4.6	1.3
	Total 				13.4			7.3	10.6	3.7
	Source: Census of Production (London: HMSO: 1924, 1930, 1935).

Table 6: Net Output in Current Terms, Average Annual Numbers Employed,




	Net output per employee (£)		218.9		233.5		231.3
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